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Introduction 
When reading about German Rules of Civil Procedure in American literature, one 
regularly comes across John H. Langbein’s famous article “The German Advantage in Civil 
Procedure” from 1985.1 Similarly, James R. Maxeiner asserts in The Atlantic in 2012 “What 
America Can Learn From Germany’s Justice System”.2 Both paint a picture of a very 
efficient, consistent, predictable and equitable system of civil procedure in Germany. 
But as Ronald J. Allen, Stefan Köck, Kurt Riecherberg and D. Toby Rosen have aptly 
pointed out, “it would be useful to know how the process actually works”,3 before drawing 
any conclusions as to a possible superiority of one system.
4
 Similarly, Holmes remarked about 
a foreign legal system, "When we contemplate such a system from the outside it seems like a 
wall of stone, every part even with all the others.... But to one brought up within it, varying 
emphasis, tacit assumptions, unwritten practices, a thousand influences gained only from life, 
may give to the different parts wholly new values that logic and grammar never could have 
got from the books.”5 
Therefore, this paper is not going to be another general comparison of the German and 
the American system of civil procedure -- other scholars have done that comprehensively and 
conclusively.
6
 Rather, I want to take a look under the cover of the Zivilprozessordnung, the 
                                                          
 
1
 John H. Langbein, “The German Advantage in Civil Procedure”, 52 University of Chicago L. Rev. 823 (1985) 
[hereafter cited as Langbein, German Advantage]. 
2
 James R. Maxeiner, “What America Can Learn From Germany’s Justice System”, The Atlantic, June 7, 2012. 
3
 Ronald J. Allen, Stefan Köck, Kurt Riecherberg, D. Toby Rosen, “The German Advantage In Civil Procedure: 
A Plea For More Details And Fewer Generalities In Comparative Scholarship”, 82 Nw. U. L. Rev. 705, 
730n118 (1988). 
4
 Id. at 726. 
5
 Diaz v. Gonzalez, 261 U.S. 102, 106 (1923)) (cited form Benjamin Kaplan “Civil Procedure – Reflections on 
the Comparison of Systems”, 9 Buff. L. Rev. 409, 415 (1959-1960)). 
6
 I will reference to those publications extensively in the footnotes throughout this paper. 
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German Code of Civil Procedure
7
 and, thereby, encourage readers to reconsider some of the 
arguments exchanged in American literature when comparing the German and the American 
system of civil procedure. 
I have observed that very little has been written in English on changes in the German 
law of civil procedure due to the last comprehensive reform of the Code of Civil Procedure 
which was passed in 2001 and enacted in 2002.
8
 But some of these changes might already 
induce a rethinking of assumed advantages of the German system, especially with regards to 
appellate proceedings. 
Moreover, since I am an active judge, instead of just presenting the current German 
Rules of Civil Procedure in theory, I intend to take a closer look at the actual practical work of 
German judges in civil trials, specifically at their impact on the substantive as well as the 
formal course of a case. 
When looking at the German Rules of Civil Procedure from the outside, especially 
from the point of view of a jurist working in an Anglo-American legal system, it stands out 
that, on a variety of grounds, German courts essentially govern the course of the proceedings. 
A German judge “operates the judicial machinery of his system”, whereas the American 
judge “presides over his dominion”.9 Not only are German judges the ones determining which 
evidence is to be taken and acting as examiner-in-chiefs in the hearing of evidence. The law 
also imposes an extensive duty of care on judges for the parties’ substantive conduct of the 
                                                          
 
7
 Official translation by the Federal Ministry of Justice: http://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/englisch_zpo/englisch_zpo.html. 
8
 Gesetz zur Reform des Zivilprozesses (Bundesgesetzblatt (BGBl.) I 2001, Nr. 40, S. 1887 ff.). 
9
 Samuel R. Gross, “The American Advantage: The Value of Inefficient Litigation” 85 Mich. L. Rev. 734, 752 
(1987). 
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case before German civil courts. The most significant provision in this regard is § 139 ZPO.
10
 
It is a pivotal rule of German civil procedure and provides the court’s Hinweispflicht 
(obligation to give notices and advice to the parties).
11
 As I will explain more closely in this 
paper,
12
 especially by giving common practical examples for its actual application, § 139 ZPO 
is of considerable relevance to the daily work of German civil judges and, as such, often a 
double edged sword. Granting the court such an extensive power to manage the substantive 
conduct of a civil case can help focus and expedite proceedings, but also imposes a large 
share of accountability for the outcome of a lawsuit on judges and sometimes actually hinders 
them in effectively resolving the case. 
Compared to this extensive substantive managing power, German judges have 
comparatively few options to govern the formal conduct of the participants of a civil lawsuit. 
Albeit, judging solely from the text of the law, there are at least some rules for German judges 
to influence the formal demeanor of the parties during the proceedings, e.g. by sanctioning 
negligent and tardy conduct. They are, however, all exclusively directed at the parties of the 
case, never their lawyers. And taking into account the practical application of these 
provisions, it turns out they are, in reality, of rather limited significance in German courts. 
Though I don’t aim to answer the question, “What America Can Learn From 
Germany’s Justice System” or whether the German civil procedure actually has an advantage 
over the American one, I rather intend to deliver an “insight into the book”, i.e. the German 
Code of Civil Procedure. I am going to illustrate how the German procedure actually works in 
practice; how the practical application of the German procedural rules, especially § 139 ZPO, 
                                                          
 
10
 = Zivilprozessordnung (Code of Civil Procedure); in German law, sections of statutes are called “paragraphs” 
and abbreviated as “§”; subsections are put in roman numerals behind the number of the section. 
11
 All translations from the German in this paper are the author’s. 
12
 See infra Part II. 
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in fact sometimes contradicts the legal intention of ensuring a speedy and fair resolution of a 
civil lawsuit; and how the, in practice, limited application of the already rare statutory 
measures to influence the formal conduct of a case might not support the image of the 
German Code of Civil Procedure as a particularly efficient system either. 
I, thereby, want to give readers the necessary insight for them to be able to reconsider, 
whether the German ZPO in its practical appliance actually measures up to the expectation of 
facilitating an efficient, consistent, predictable and equitable system of civil procedure. 
Because, in my option, only if one understands how the “process actually works”, one can 
seriously try to answer this question. Therefore, one should beware of judging a book just by 
its cover. 
To be put in the position to really understand the spirit and purpose of the German 
system of civil procedure and § 139 ZPO, Part I of this paper will 1. present the general 
principles underlying the German Code of Civil Procedure, 2. give a swift overview of how 
regular civil cases are generally dealt with before a German court -- highlighting the, in 
practice, most important changes of the ZPO since 2002 and pointing out the most significant 
practical differences to the American civil system, and 3. summarize the comparison of the 
German and the American systems of civil procedure in previous American academic 
literature, particularly regarding the aspects of both systems that are generally assessed as 
beneficial or adverse to a well-functioning civil judiciary. 
Part II will, then, focus on § 139 ZPO, the pivotal provision for the substantive 
managing capacity of German civil judges. I will present 1. the statute, 2. the spirit and 
purpose of the provision, 3. the limits to the statute’s application, 4. practical problems and 
questions when applying § 139 ZPO, and 5. discuss the ‘two edges of the sword’ that § 139 
ZPO is. 
7 
 
Part III will show the different statutory measures to influence the formal conduct of 
the case, i.e. to sanction parties violating their duty to state the facts of the case 
comprehensively, truthfully (§ 138 I ZPO) and in a timely manner (§ 282 I ZPO). But it will 
also present the legal limitations of these regulations as well as their restricted application and 
therefore minor practical relevance in German civil courts. 
Finally, I will conclude. 
 
 
8 
 
Part I 
1. Canons of German Civil Procedure 
To better grasp the Zivilprozessordnung (ZPO -- German Code of Civil Procedure) it 
is helpful to understand some basic principles of German civil procedure. 
a) Beibringungsgrundsatz (principle of party presentation) 
Probably the most important canon of German civil procedure is the 
Dispositionsmaxime (maxim of disposition), also called Beibringungsgrundsatz (principle of 
party presentation). This principle provides that litigating parties have the right as well as the 
duty to bring forward the necessary information and materials on which the court must base 
its decision.
13
 Thus, the plaintiff, by her
14
 factual allegations supporting her claim, and the 
defendant, by her factual allegations relating to her defense, determine the scope of the 
litigation with respect to the facts.
15
 It is exclusively for the parties and their lawyers to 
identify the facts they think will support the claim or defense, to make the appropriate factual 
allegations,
16
 and to adduce the means of proof upon which each party intends to rely.
17
 So 
the parties control the issues presented for the decision and they also select the evidence to be 
considered. 
Hence, it is a general misunderstanding, if the German system of civil procedure is 
regularly described as an “inquisitorial” system, since German judges act as examiner-in-
                                                          
 
13
 Michael Halberstam, “The American Advantage in Civil Procedure? An Autopsy of the Deutsche Telekom 
Litigation”, Buffalo Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 2015-021, to be published (available at: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2576453) 29 (2015). 
14
 In this paper I have used to female pronoun for reasons of brevity and clarity of expression. This is, however, 
naturally meant to include the male counterpart, too. 
15
 Allen, et al. (note 3), at 722. 
16
 Hein Kötz, “Civil Justice Systems in Europe And The United States”, 1 Duke L. CICLOPs 1, 6 (2009). 
17
 Allen, et al. (note 3), at 723. 
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chiefs in taking the evidence.
18
 Due to the Beibringungsgrundsatz the German civil procedure 
is as much an adversarial system as the American one is, because it lies exclusively in the 
hands and therefore the responsibility of the parties to provide the facts of the case and the 
means of evidence to the court. 
Judges have to respect the autonomy of the parties to determine what evidence is 
submitted for consideration,
19
 since the enforcement of legal rights is left to the self-interest of 
those concerned.
20
 The structure of the civil process does not allow the court to call any 
witness unless a litigant has expressly named her in the proceeding by identifying specific 
facts of which the witness is alleged to have knowledge (§ 373 ZPO).
21
 Hence, German 
judges do not have an inquisitorial responsibility to determine the truth, but are required to 
confine their consideration to facts from those sources which have been brought forward or 
identified by the parties.
22
 The duty to advance materials dictates that the parties’ failure to 
proffer evidence necessary for their case will result in defeat.
23
 
Facts not in dispute between the parties are beyond judicial scrutiny, nor can judges do 
anything about a fact alleged by one party and not substantiiert bestritten (specifically 
challenged)
24
 by the opponent.
25
 No formal admissions are required under German law for 
this principle to apply. Judges must take any unchallenged fact as established. Even if they 
                                                          
 
18
 See Oscar G. Chase, “American “Exceptionalism” and Comparative Procedure”, New York University 
School of Law, Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper Series Research Paper No. 39 (available at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=306759) 15 (2002). 
19
 Halberstam (note 13), at 30. 
20
 Arthur Taylor von Mehren, “Some Comparative Reflections On First Instance Civil Procedure: Recent 
Reforms In German Civil Procedure And In The Federal Rules”, 63 Notre Dame L. Rev. 609, 610 (1988). 
21
 Herbert L. Bernstein, “Whose Advantage After All?: A Comment on the Comparison of Civil Justice Systems”, 
21 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 587, 592 (1987-1988). 
22
 Peter L. Murry & Rolf Stürner, “German Civil Justice”, 2004, p. 158. 
23
 Halberstam (note 13), at 29-30 -- citing HUANG, INTRODUCING DISCOVERY INTO CIVIL LAW 22 
(2007). 
24
 See § 138 II ZPO. 
25
 Exempt are only facts of general knowledge. 
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believe the facts presented by the parties to be untrue, they have no power to unearth what 
they think might be the truth by introducing independent evidence.
26
 The principle applicable 
to uncontroverted facts in civil procedure is called Prinzip der formellen Wahrheit (principle 
of formal truth).
27
 It is contrasted with the Prinzip der materiellen Wahrheit (principle of 
substantive truth) in German criminal procedure which enables judges to disregard any 
admissions and confessions.
28
 
The Beibringungsgrundsatz also involves the duty to substantiate 
(Substantiierungspflicht). § 138 I ZPO requires parties to state the facts comprehensively and 
truthfully.
29
 Pursuant to this requirement the court may order further proof-taking only where 
a party can generally describe the facts that the evidence is intended to prove. The 
substantiation requirement is intended to prevent parties from using the court to “probe” or 
“fish” for evidence of which the parties have no specific knowledge.30 
German procedure does not, however, require the parties or their attorneys to say 
anything about the law at all. German procedure goes by the principle of “da mihi factum, 
dabo tibi ius”--“give me the facts and I will give you the law.”31 
b) Verhandlungsmaxime (principle of orality) 
Though much of the proceedings are actually conducted in writing, the German Code 
of Civil Procedure is founded on the Mündlichkeitsprinzip or Verhandlungsmaxime (principle 
                                                          
 
26
 Kötz (note 16), at 6. 
27
 Bernstein (note 21), at 591-92; see also Kötz (note 16), at 7. 
28
 Bernstein (note 21), at 591-92. 
29
 Dr. Michael Bohlander, “The German Advantage Revisited: An Inside View Of German Civil Procedure In 
The Nineties”, 13 Tul. Eur. & Civ. L.F. 25, 33 (1998) [hereafter cited as Bohlander, German Advantage 
Revisited]. 
30
 John C. Reitz, “Why We Probably Cannot Adopt The German Advantage In Civil Procedure”, 75 Iowa L. 
Rev. 987, 1001-02 (1990). 
31
 Bohlander, German Advantage Revisited (note 29), at 35; Benjamin Kaplan, Arthur T. von Mehren, Rudolf 
Schaefer “Phases of German Civil Procedure I”, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 1193, 1216/17 (1958) [hereafter cited as 
Kaplan, et al., Civil Procedure I]. 
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of orality).
32
 Orality means that the regular (though not the only) means of party 
communication with the court is supposed to be by oral statement in open court.
33
 Strictly 
speaking, written pleadings, briefs, and similar exchanges between the parties are only means 
of preparation for the oral hearing. Yet over the years and again with the last major reform of 
the ZPO in 2002
34
 the emphasis on orality has become less pronounced. It has become more 
common for attorneys and judges to incorporate the assertions of the pleadings and briefs into 
the oral discussion by reference. Under certain circumstances parties can agree to forego oral 
proceedings.
35
 And, also under certain circumstances, decisions by the Berufungsgericht (first 
court of appeal) can be issued without an oral hearing in a written court order.
36
 
c) Konzentrationsmaxime (principle of concentration) 
Another substantial canon of German civil procedure is the Konzentrationsmaxime, 
which can be translated as the "principle of concentration", but not equated with the rule of 
concentrated trial in Anglo-American law. The Konzentrationsmaxime expresses nothing 
more than the general efficiency value that the court should handle the case as rapidly as 
possible, and, where possible, in a single hearing.
37
 Thus, this canon correlates with the 
Beschleunigungsgrundsatz (principle of expedition). 
But not only courts are obligated to expedite proceedings. Parties also have a 
Prozessförderungspflicht (duty to facilitate the lawsuit) as § 282 I ZPO requires them to 
submit to the court their means of challenge or defense as promptly as it corresponds to a 
                                                          
 
32
 See § 128 I ZPO: The parties argue the legal issues in dispute orally before the court. 
33
 William B. Fisch “Recent Developments in West German Civil Procedure”, 6 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 
221, 223-24 (1982-1983). 
34
 Gesetz zur Reform des Zivilprozesses (BGBl. I 2001, Nr. 40, S. 1887 ff.). 
35
 Murray/Stürner (note 22), at 185; see § 128 II ZPO. 
36
 § 522 II ZPO; See infra Part I 2. f). 
37
 § 272 I ZPO; see infra Part II 2. a); Langbein, German Advantage (note 1), at 827n9; see § 272 I ZPO. 
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diligent pursuit of the proceedings and serves to promote them.
38
 The court can specify this 
obligation for a thorough and speedy conduct of the case by setting deadlines for motions and 
briefs to be entered within.
39
 
d) Anspruch auf rechtliches Gehör (constitutional right to be heard) 
Last but not least, for the purposes of this paper, the Anspruch auf rechtliches Gehör 
(constitutional right to be heard) needs to be mentioned and explained. It is not only founded 
on the German Constitution,
40
 but also on the European Convention of Human Rights.
41
 This 
right to be heard seeks to guarantee fair proceedings between the parties and, as will be shown 
in this paper, underlies many of the requirements of the ZPO.
42
 However, it does not 
necessitate parties to actually be heard on every potential issue. It suffices if they have 
reasonable opportunity to take a position on the significant factual or legal propositions, either 
orally or in writing, before these aspects are used as basis for a judicial decision.
43
 
The Anspruch auf rechtliches Gehör also requires judges to consider and address each 
significant contention of fact or law put forward by the parties. Otherwise their decision will 
be legally defective and, therefore, assailable.
44
 
§ 139 ZPO is one of the most significant provisions embodying the right to be heard in 
German civil procedure. It provides the court’s Hinweispflicht (obligation to give notices and 
advice) and will be explained and discussed in detail in Part II of this paper. 
                                                          
 
38
 Prof. Dr. h.c. Hanns Prütting, in Münchener Kommentar zur ZPO, 4th ed. (2013), § 282 para. 4. 
39
 Dr. Klaus Bacher, in Beck’scher Online-Kommentar ZPO, 19th ed. (2015), § 282 para. 1; see § 273 II No. 1 
und §§ 275-277 ZPO. 
40
 Art. 103 I, 20 Grundgesetz (GG -- German Constitution). 
41
 Art. 6 I ECHR. 
42
 Murray/Stürner (note 22), at 188. 
43
 Id. at 188n179. 
44
 Id. at 188-89. 
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2. Swift Overview of the Course of Action before a German Civil Court45 
a) Initiation 
A lawsuit before a German court is commenced with a Klageschrift (written 
complaint) by the plaintiff or her lawyer
46
. This complaint narrates the key facts, may set forth 
a legal theory, and asks for a remedy in damages or specific relief.
47
 It also specifies and 
confines the matter in dispute, as the court is actually bound by the plaintiff’s relief sought. A 
final judgement may not grant more than the plaintiff has sought for in her complaint (§ 308 I 
1 ZPO).
48
 
After this petition has been filed, the competent judge has to decide how to proceed 
with the case. Most civil cases before German courts are decided by judges sitting alone. This 
is a rule that has been further expanded by the reform of civil proceedings of 2002. 
All cases before Amtsgerichten (Local Courts) that have jurisdiction over all disputes 
between landlords and tenants, family law cases and general civil cases with a monetary value 
of up to €5,000 (§§ 23, 23a GVG)49 are taken by a judge sitting alone (§ 22 I GVG). Other 
civil cases are tried before Landgerichten (Regional Courts),
50
 where cases, as a rule, are also 
heard by a single judge (§ 348 I ZPO). The decision, however, lies with a Kammer (division 
consisting of three judges),
51
 if the legal dispute is classified in certain fields of the law (§ 348 
II ZPO), if it shows particular factual or legal difficulties, is of fundamental significance, or if 
                                                          
 
45
 For a more comprehensive description of civil proceedings in a German court see particularly Langbein, 
German Advantage (note 1) and Giesela Rühl, “Preparing Germany for the 21st Century: The Reform of the 
Code of Civil Procedure“, 6 German L.J. 909 (2005). 
46
 The general principle is that only the parties to first instance disputes before the Landgericht (Regional Court) 
must be represented by an attorney (§ 78 ZPO). 
47
 § 253 ZPO. 
48
 Murray/Stürner (note 22), at 156-57. 
49
 Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz (GVG -- Courts Constitution Act). Official translation by the Federal Ministry of 
Justice: http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gvg/index.html#gl_p0143. 
50
 § 71 I GVG. 
51
 § 59 I GVG. 
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such a decision is petitioned by the parties in congruent declarations (§ 348 III ZPO). Prior to 
2002 cases were generally decided by the Kammer in civil cases before the Regional Court 
and could only be delegated to one of the three judges, if they showed no particular factual or 
legal difficulties and were of no fundamental significance. As shown above, this rule has been 
reversed as of 2002. 
Following the abovementioned Konzentrationsmaxime (principle of concentration), 
§ 272 I ZPO encourages the court to dispose of the case in a single hearing if circumstances 
permit. The provision reads: "Ordinarily, the case should be resolved in a single hearing 
(Haupttermin -- main hearing), comprehensively prepared."
52
 
According to § 129 I ZPO, this main hearing is to be prepared by written pleadings by 
both parties (vorbereitende Schriftsätze). Each brief is to serve the purpose of informing the 
court as well as the opponent
53
 to enable the latter to declare her position on all issues of fact 
or law and in particular to adduce the required means of proof for all disputed facts.
54
 
The judge will review the written submissions prior to the hearing and thus be able to 
focus discussion on questions left unanswered by the written pleadings.
55
 In aid of this 
comprehensive preparation, § 273 ZPO authorizes the court to take various steps in advance 
of the hearing, for example, requiring the parties to clarify positions, obtaining documents or 
summoning parties and witnesses to the hearing.
56
 These measures are supposed to enable the 
court to dispose of the case within a single main hearing, if possible.
57
 
                                                          
 
52
 Langbein, German Advantage (note 1), at 826n9. 
53
 Kaplan, et al., Civil Procedure I (note 31), at 1213. 
54
 See § 130 ZPO. 
55
 Halberstam (note 13), at 10. 
56
 Langbein, German Advantage (note 1), at 826n9. 
57
 Kaplan, et al., Civil Procedure I (note 31), at 1208. 
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b) No Discovery 
At this point it should be emphasized that in German civil procedure there is no 
litigant discovery. There is no specific phase of the litigation process dedicated to the 
exploration or collection of evidentiary materials; nor is there a general right to obtain 
relevant information in connection with the proceedings.
58
 The German system remains 
relatively indifferent to possibilities for pretrial exchange of information and evidence 
between parties.
59
 
Until recently, German law held the idea that no party has to help her opponent in her 
inquiry into the facts. To make it generally mandatory for parties to give each other 
information or to disclose all relevant data during court proceedings has been overwhelmingly 
rejected by German courts and the legal academy,
60
 on the grounds of protection of privacy 
and business secrets, and in order to prevent trials from becoming a means of exerting 
pressure.
61
 German law does try, however, to achieve a similar effect to a real inquiry into the 
facts with the help of the abovementioned duty to make substantiated statements about the 
facts of the case (§ 138 ZPO)
62
 or by shifting of the burden of proof.
63
 A system of equitably 
                                                          
 
58
 Halberstam (note 13), at 12. 
59
 Fisch (note 33), at 280. 
60
 Bundesgerichtshof (BGH -- Federal Supreme Court) Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (NJW) 128, 129 (1997); 
BGH Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (NJW) 3151 (1990). Germany, therefore, has declared that it will not 
execute Letters of Request issued for the purpose of obtaining pre-trial discovery of documents as known in 
Common Law countries (see Art. 23 of the 20. CONVENTION ON THE TAKING OF EVIDENCE ABROAD 
IN CIVIL OR COMMERCIAL MATTER and the § 7 HaagÜbkAG). 
61
 Peter Gottwald, “Civil Procedure Reform In Germany”, 45 Am. J. Comp. L. 753, 760 (1997); see also 
Bundestagsdrucksache (BT-Drs.) 14/6036, S. 120. 
62
 A so-called sekundäre Behauptungslast (secondary duty to substantiate) is imposed on the opponent, if the 
primarily obligated party stands outside the respective course of events and, therefore, has no further knowledge 
of them, while the opponent has this knowledge and further submissions by her are just and reasonable (BGH 
Neue Juristische Wochenschrift Rechtsprechungs-Report (NJW-RR) 1496, 1498-99 (2005); BGH Neue 
Juristische Wochenschrift (NJW) 2395, 2397 (2005); BGH Neue Juristische Wochenschrift Rechtsprechungs-
Report (NJW-RR) 396, 399 (2001)). 
63
 See for example § 630h Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB -- German Civil Code), which provides extensive 
presumptions for cause and liability in medical malpractice cases; the proof of exoneration then falls to the 
defendant. 
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balanced substantive law duties to provide information, and the sanctioning of refusals to give 
information when made in bad faith, has been established,
64
 though the means generally 
remain limited.
65
 
The parties are thus expected to rely on their personal knowledge and any materials in 
their possession, including police files and records of criminal proceedings, which may 
contain statements of persons who are likely to be called as witnesses in the civil litigation to 
make out their case.
66
 It is, in this context, especially uncommon for counsel to contact and/or 
talk to potential witnesses before the trial. Germans have long had a canon of professional 
ethics either prohibiting or discouraging out-of-court contact with nonparty witnesses.
67
 § 6 of 
the Richtlinien der Bundesrechtsanwaltskammer für die Ausübung des Anwaltsberufs 
(Recommendations of German Federal Bar Association Relating to the Exercise of the Legal 
Profession) from 1976
68
 specifically provided that, out of court, lawyers may indeed 
interrogate persons who might be called as witnesses, with respect to their knowledge, when 
such is necessary for a dutiful clarification of the factual situation, advice, or representation. 
But the provision specifically concluded with the admonition that, in every case, even the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
Official translation by the Federal Ministry of Justice: http://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/englisch_bgb/englisch_bgb.html#p2673. 
64
 Gottwald (note 61), at 760. 
65
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§ 6 Questioning and Advising of Witnesses 
(1)  The lawyer may question persons out of court who might be considered witnesses, if this is necessary with a 
view to the obligation to provide for clarification of facts, advice or representation. 
(2)  The lawyer may inform these persons as regards their rights and duties as well as give advice to them. 
(3)  The lawyer is allowed to establish a record of such questioning and to have the person sign a declaration. 
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trial discovery stage or during the proceedings. […] 
(5)  In any event, the appearance of undue influence is to be avoided. 
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appearance of undue influence is to be avoided.
69
 Even though this rule was dropped when 
new provisions on professional ethics were enacted in 1996, a lawyer not willing to follow 
this standard still has to take into account that German judges usually consider the reliability 
of the testimony of witnesses, who previously have discussed the case with counsel, or who 
have consorted unduly with a party, very critically.
70
 
c) Settlement 
Settlement has always been a high priority in German civil justice.
71
 The Code of Civil 
Procedure has long required civil courts to “be mindful of a compromise settlement of the 
dispute or particular issues at all stages of the lawsuit” (§ 278 I ZPO).72 The newly reformed 
Code of Civil Procedure even introduced the requirement of a formal Güteverhandlung 
(settlement conference) before the commencement of any oral proceedings in all civil cases 
unless there was a prior formal attempt to reach a settlement at an out-of-court Gütestelle 
(conciliation facility), or unless such a settlement conference “appears clearly futile” (§ 278 II 
ZPO).
73
 This Güteverhandlung can be held as a separate meeting by the involved parties, but 
is commonly part of the main hearing. During this Güteverhandlung the court is to discuss 
with the parties the facts as well as the status of the dispute thus far, assessing all 
circumstances without any restrictions and asking questions wherever required. It is not 
uncommon, at this stage, for judges to propose specific settlement amounts and terms to be 
discussed by the parties and counsel.
74
 § 278 VI ZPO also authorizes judges to send a written 
settlement proposal to the parties. If both parties accept this proposal in writing, the judge can 
                                                          
 
69
 von Mehren (note 20), at 619; Kaplan (note 5), at 411. 
70
 Kötz (note 16), at 5; Kaplan, et al., Civil Procedure I (note 31), at 1200-01; Reitz (note 30), at 994. 
71
 Fisch (note 33), at 257. 
72
 Murray/Stürner (note 22), at 245, 487. 
73
 Murray/Stürner (note 22), at 246, 487-88. 
74
 Bohlander, German Advantage Revisited (note 29), at 40; Murray/Stürner (note 22), at 260. 
18 
 
document the resulting settlement by simple court order with the effect of an in-court 
settlement.
75
 
Since July 2012
76
 the German Code of Civil Procedure has also recognized in-court 
mediation as it authorizes judges to refer the parties to a Güterichter (conciliation judge) for 
the settlement conference, as well as for further attempts at resolving the dispute. Güterichter 
are appointed by the court as such and are not authorized to rule upon the given case at any 
time. 
d) Main Hearing 
Once the judge is reasonably familiar with the issues of a case and any “pre-trial” (or 
rather pre-hearing) attempts for a settlement remained unsuccessful, she will summon the 
lawyers and -- on a regular basis -- the parties to the main hearing. She will also summon to 
this session witnesses or experts indicated by the parties, if proof has to be taken on disputed 
facts that she deems relevant for her decision. So the court determines the scope and the 
means of proof-taking. Evidence is only presented and heard as far as deemed relevant by the 
judge. 
(1) Sequence 
The sequence of the main hearing, as specified by §§ 137, 278, 279 ZPO, can 
generally be described as follows:
77
 
(a) call of the case and identification of participants present; 
(b) introduction and statement of the case by the presiding judge; 
(c) response of the parties, if any, to that statement; 
(d) discussion of the case among court, attorneys and parties; 
(e) consideration of possible settlement options;
78
 
                                                          
 
75
 Id. at 247-48. 
76
 Gesetz zur Förderung der Mediation und anderer Verfahren der außergerichtlichen Konfliktbeilegung (BGBl. 
I 2012, Nr. 35, S. 1577 ff.). 
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(f) proof-taking; 
(g) further discussion and argument with reference to the results of the proof-
taking and, again, consideration of settlement options; 
(h) deliberation by the court; and 
(i) announcement of the judgement, or fixing of a subsequent date for the 
announcement, possibly with an interim deadline for additional written 
statements by the parties.
79
 
(2) Proof-taking 
Judges do not only ask the relevant questions to the parties during the main hearing. 
The interrogation at proof-taking is also essentially conducted by the court. 
For the questioning of witnesses § 396 ZPO provides that the witness is first to be 
invited to tell in narrative form, without undue interruption, what she knows about the matter 
on which she has been called. This is to be followed by questions designed to test, clarify, and 
amplify her story. But when the basic facts are already before the court, questioning 
oftentimes begins at once. Counsel and the parties are entitled to additional questions (§ 397 
ZPO),
80
 but they are generally not prominent as examiners.
81
 Witnesses are not prepared in 
advance by the court, nor by counsel, and they do not all have to testify at a single hearing. 
There is no set order to a German trial -- nothing similar to the American sequence of 
plaintiff's case-in-chief, defendant's case, plaintiff's rebuttal and so forth.
82
 
Parties can also rely on experts’ opinions to prove their case in German courts. In the 
German system experts are, however, not witnesses when it comes to their specific expert 
knowledge, but court-appointed aides of the judge in finding her decision
83
 and therefore 
selected and appointed by the court (§ 404 ZPO). However, they are paid for in advance by 
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the party, whose contention she is supposed to prove according to the burden of proof,
84
 and 
eventually by the losing party.
85
 The parties only adduce the hearing of an expert on certain 
facts as a means of proof, but they do not present a specific expert themselves. Experts 
usually prepare their findings in a written report and are regularly summoned to appear in 
person at the following hearing,
86
 if additional questions by the court or the parties arise. In 
this respect, the rules applicable for the evidence provided by witnesses apply respectively to 
the evidence provided by experts (§ 402 ZPO). 
(3) Record 
The actual course of the hearing is to be kept in a record (§§ 159, 160 ZPO), which 
used to be taken by record clerks. But most judges nowadays use Dictaphones and the 
recordings are later transcribed into a written record of the hearing.
87
 
Hence, the German system does not only give responsibility to the judges for 
determining the order of proof, providing for, calling, and carrying out the examination of 
witnesses and experts, but also for creating a compact -- not verbatim -- record of the 
witnesses' and experts’ testimony by dictating summaries of that testimony into the transcript 
of the hearing.
88
 If the case is appealed, these concise summaries constitute the record for the 
reviewing court.
89
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e) Judgement 
After the main hearing, judges have to evaluate the factual and legal aspects of the 
case to come to a final decision. In particular, they have to ascertain whether the plaintiff or 
the defendant have proven the facts supporting their claim/defense. In doing so, they have to 
take into account the prevailing standards of the burden of proof originating from the 
substantive civil law. The general rule is that every party must offer the evidence and 
eventually prove all the facts which are necessary to justify their claim or defense.
90
 The court 
has to decide, whether an assertion is to be deemed true or untrue, at its discretion and 
conviction, and taking into account the entire content of the hearings and the results obtained 
by the evidence taken (§ 286 I ZPO). A fact is generally held to be proved, if the judge has 
reached a “degree of personal certainty that silences any reasonable doubt”;91 it is not enough 
for judges to believe the fact to be more likely true than not. 
If new aspects have arisen in the main hearing or the court deems further proof-taking 
necessary for its decision, it will advise the parties accordingly and have them respond to this, 
if necessary in writing. Alternatively, it will set a date for a subsequent hearing to which it 
will again summon the lawyers and, if required, the parties, witnesses and/or experts. So even 
though § 272 I ZPO encourages judges to dispose of a case in a single hearing, the “trial” can 
actually consist of a series of hearings, as many as circumstances demand.
92
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If the court finds that all relevant aspects of a case have been argued sufficiently and 
all necessary and/or available proof has been taken, it will render its judgement. The mandate 
of the judgement usually consists of three parts: (1) Sentence as to the actual relief granted; 
(2) Sentence as to who has to bear the court costs and the attorney's fees, and (3) Sentence as 
to whether the judgement shall be subject to immediate execution.
93
 The court’s ruling always 
has to be put in writing and state the merits of the case as well as the legal reasons on which 
the decision is based (§ 313 ZPO),
94
 so that the parties may decide if they want to appeal the 
decision or accept it.
95
 There cannot be a public dissenting opinion or any published opinion 
other than the court's as embodied in the judgement.
96
 
f) Appeal 
There are two levels of appeal in civil cases before German courts. At first, there is the 
Berufung (second instance appeal) to the Landgericht (Regional Court) or the 
Oberlandesgericht (High Court).
97
 Then there is the Revision (review appeal or third instance 
appeal) to the Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Supreme Court).
98
 
The Revision to the Federal Supreme Court has always been an appeal solely on law 
and procedure. Additionally, only cases are admissible to the Federal Supreme Court in which 
the legal matter is of fundamental significance, or the further development of the law or the 
interests in ensuring a unified legal practice require a decision to be handed down by the 
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Federal Supreme Court, and the appellate court therefore granted leave to appeal (§ 543 
ZPO). 
In contrast, the Berufung, the first level of appeal, used to involve review de novo, in 
which the appellate court was supposed to form its own view of the facts, both from the 
record and, if appropriate, by recalling witnesses and experts or summoning new ones.
99
 It 
effectively gave the parties “a second bite at the apple”.100 
This is no longer valid. Since the comprehensive reform of the German civil procedure 
enacted in 2002
101
 the first level of appeal also only involves a review for error.
102
 The first 
appeal may now only be based on the objection that the decision has been based on a violation 
of the law, because a legal norm has not been applied or has not been applied properly (§ 546 
ZPO), or that the facts the decision was based upon justify a different decision (§ 513 ZPO). 
So under the current standard of review, the first appellate court is required to accept factual 
findings of the first-instance court “unless specific indications give rise to doubts as to the 
court having correctly or completely established the facts relevant for its decision, and 
therefore indicate the necessity for a new determination of facts” (§ 529 I ZPO).103 
Furthermore, there are only very narrow exceptions as to when new means of challenge or 
defense can be admitted before the court of appeal (§ 531 ZPO). As a result of the limited 
reexamination of first instance fact findings as well as the restricted admission of new facts 
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and means of proof, the parties have to strive to present all relevant facts and accessible 
evidence at the first instance.
104
 
Another fundamental change in the law of appellate remedies brought by the reform 
effective since 2002 concerns the modality of how to dispose of an appeal. Traditionally, the 
appellate court was only allowed to dismiss an appeal by simple court order without oral 
hearing, if the appeal was not filed correctly formally, e.g. not within due time (§ 522 I 
ZPO).
105
 The reform law introduced an additional opportunity, if not obligation,
106
 in § 522 II 
ZPO to dispose of an appeal by way of court order, if the court unanimously finds that (1) the 
appeal obviously has no chance of success, (2) the case does not raise an issue of fundamental 
significance and (3) neither the development of the law nor the preservation of a unified legal 
practice require a decision of the Federal Supreme Court.
107
 However, before issuing such a 
court order, the court has to advise the parties as to its intention to dismiss the appeal 
according to § 522 II ZPO, give its reasons for the decision and grant the appellant the 
opportunity to respond. This is supposed to warrant the abovementioned constitutional right to 
be heard, even if the Mündlichkeitsprinzip (principle of orality) is no longer followed. 
g) Costs 
Generally, costs of a civil lawsuit are dispensed by the loser-pays rule, § 91 I ZPO. 
Whoever has not prevailed in the dispute is to bear the entire costs of the lawsuit. This general 
rule applies to all court instances (§ 97 ZPO).
108
 If, however, both parties win and lose in part, 
§ 92 I 1 ZPO provides allocation among the parties according to the quota of success and 
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failure to prove one's case.
109
 The respective shares are determined by the court in its final 
judgement. 
The court’s sentence as to who has to bear the costs of the lawsuit includes the court 
costs as well as any costs for witnesses or experts,
110
 and in particular any costs incurred by 
the opponent. The two most important cost elements, general court fees and attorneys' fees, 
are fixed by statutory fee scales graduated by the value of the claim,
111
 which has to be 
determined by the court, especially if the claim is nonpecuniary.
112
 All fees are fixed by a 
combination of the amount in controversy and classes of procedural event (filing, hearing, 
settlement, and judgement).
113
 
The responsibility to reimburse the opponent extends to the expenses necessarily 
incurred by the winner, generally without regard to whether the loser had plausible or even 
excellent reason for initiating or defending the case.
114
 Remuneration agreements between 
lawyer and client are, under certain conditions, admissible (§ 3a RVG).
115
 Even contingency 
fees that were prohibited in Germany until July 2008
116
 may now be agreed upon for 
individual cases (§ 4a RVG). But if the party entering into this kind of agreement succeeds in 
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the litigation, she will be reimbursed only according to the statutory tariff and will have to pay 
the remainder without reimbursement.
117
 
For the sake of completeness it should be noted that Germany has a broad system of 
public legal aid. Everyone who is involved in a lawsuit, whether as plaintiff or as defendant, is 
entitled to state legal aid, if she is financially not able to bear the costs of the action (court 
costs as well as her lawyer’s fees) entirely or in part, the action or defense offers sufficient 
prospects of success and does not seem frivolous (§ 114 ZPO).
118
 An application for legal aid 
is approved or denied by the court hearing the case (§ 127 I ZPO). 
3.  Summary of American Academic Literature on the Comparison of German 
and American Civil Procedure 
Many authors have compared the systems of German and American civil procedure 
and have pointed out various characteristics of both, which some of them see as virtues, others 
as vices. While the considerations underlying both systems are similar, the values assigned to 
them differ considerably.
119
 
a) Judges’ Role 
The most obvious and at the same time most fundamental difference between both 
systems is the role of German and American judges hearing civil cases. Samuel R. Gross 
describes the German judge to “operate(…) the judicial machinery of his system”, whereas 
the American judge “presides over his dominion”.120 
German civil procedure is a judge-driven system, and every reform of the law of civil 
procedure, up to the one in effect since 2002, as well as the legal practice of the higher 
                                                          
 
117
 Kaplan, et al., Civil Procedure II (note 99), at 1466. 
118
 See §§ 114 - 127a ZPO for more details; also Murray/Stürner (note 22), at 117 ff.. 
119
 Kaplan (note 5), at 431. 
120
 Gross (note 9), at 752. 
27 
 
courts
121
 has reinforced that tendency. A number of functions which are performed principally 
by the lawyers or a court reporter in the United States are allocated to the judge in Germany, 
who “plays the central role in building the record”.122 The most important of these functions 
are: (1) determination of the trial agenda based on the parties’ submissions,123 including an 
order of proof, directing appearance of the parties and witnesses, and the presentation of 
documents; (2) examination of parties and witnesses, with lawyers performing only a 
secondary role; (3) production of the record of witnesses' and experts’ testimonies, including 
questions and frequently rephrasing or reorganizing answers; and (4) direct communication 
with the parties, not only for factual assertions, but also to explore settlement possibilities. 
While German procedural theory continues to adhere to the Beibringungsgrundsatz (principle 
of party presentation) in civil cases, it is clear that this guarantees only judges' ultimate 
dependence on the raw material which the parties present. The opportunity of judges, as fact 
finders, to influence the form and organization of the material on which they must base their 
findings, and even to stimulate production of more material,
124
 is much greater in the German 
than in the American system.
125
 § 139 ZPO which will be subject of Part II of this paper also 
supports the power German judges have to actively influence the substantive course of a civil 
case. 
Benjamin Kaplan, Arthur T. von Mehren and Rudolf Schaefer even go so far as to say 
that -- “with some stretch of the imagination” -- one could see in the German judge “a 
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common image of the paterfamilias, also endowed […] with some of the characteristics of a 
bureaucrat. Charged with responsibility for finding just solutions to the quarrels brought 
before him, having a large measure of power and considerable willingness to exercise it, the 
German judge sits high and exalted over the parties, dominating the courtroom scene. At the 
same time he is constantly descending to the level of the litigants, as an examiner, patient or 
hectoring, as counselor and adviser and as an insistent promoter of settlements”.126 
The German judge acts in cooperation with counsel “of somewhat muted adversary 
zeal”.127 In contrast, the American system exploits the free-wheeling energies of counsel and 
places them in adversary confrontation before a detached judge.
128
 By setting judges above 
the fray, this adversary system is said to enhance their prestige and autonomy, and to make 
them more effective as guarantors of individual rights.
129
 Each side prepares its own case for 
presentation to the court. The judge remains passive, there is no judicial preparation of the 
case, the parties' lawyers serve as principal examiners, and there are verbatim transcripts of 
testimony.
130
 
b) Efficiency 
Due to these specific features, the American system of civil procedure is oftentimes 
criticized as being expensive and ineffective. In 1984, the then Chief Justice of the United 
States, Warren Burger, warned the ABA convention that the American system was “too 
costly, too painful, too destructive, too inefficient for a truly civilized people”.131 
But there are also various aspects argued as “advantages of inefficiency”. 
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(1) 
The Anglo-American adversarial method of litigation is defended on the ground that it 
is uniquely respectful of the autonomy of the individual.
132
 Indeed, by making “legal medicine 
expensive and unpalatable”, “the danger that it will be overused” is reduced and, therefore, 
individual autonomy and privacy in contrast to “coercive state intervention in private 
conduct” is promoted.133 In other words, inefficiency limits the effectiveness, the 
“penetration” of formal legal rules, and creates room for divergent results and for patterns of 
behavior based on non-legal norms.
134
 
(2) 
The inefficiency in a system of adjudication is also said to be an advantage, since it 
deters litigation and, therefore, conserves resources; fewer court cases cost less to handle.
135
 
Others, however, counter this position and argue that the American civil justice system 
does not lead to a "conservation of resources" by deterring litigation. Rather than saving costs 
it merely externalizes them, since the American-style contract generates more costs at the 
drafting stage in an attempt to avoid litigation. This, obviously, increases the costs of doing 
business in all fairly important instances, so the business community and the consumer in 
general subsidize the relatively small number of transactions in which serious performance 
problems arise.
136
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(3) 
Furthermore, it is debatable if and to what extend the American system of civil 
procedure is actually inefficient, especially when it comes to the so-called “Big Cases”. 
While the German system depends crucially on an efficient judicial bureaucracy, with 
high standards for training and performance,
137
 the American system is rather built on 
specialization: each actor is trained for a single role, so each task can be performed by that set 
of actors who have been assigned to the appropriate role and who have received the proper 
training.
138
 This might not only lead to a higher standard of quality, but the separation and 
specialization of tasks, and especially the outsourcing of discovery to a team of litigation 
attorneys for each party, can lead to a far more speedy resolution of disputes, and may even be 
necessary to process the large amounts of information required in “Big Cases”, e.g. to 
investigate wrongdoing by large organizations with tens of thousands of employees and 
thousands of offices and properties. Large projects require specialization and teamwork, 
which also renders them more efficient, whereas in complex cases a single German judge (or 
even a panel of three judges) may simply become overwhelmed
139
 and unable to handle the 
so-called “Big Case.”140 
(4) 
Last but not least, it is argued that the existence of the discovery stage in the American 
civil procedure actually enhances the search for the actual truth, since there are the various 
impediments
141
 to obtaining evidence in the German system.
142
 Additionally, there are certain 
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risks immanent to the examination of witnesses as conducted in German courts. One might 
say, for example, that the technique of inviting witnesses to tell their story in narrative form 
and without undue interruption provides an incentive, in the interest of presenting a 
conclusive, logically coherent, and convincing story, to fill in gaps by half‐ truths or fiction. 
Experience also shows that witnesses aim to please, as it may be, even the court. So it has to 
be taken into account that witnesses might tend to try to give the answer they assume the court 
expects them to give. Furthermore, judges, in acting as chief‐examiners of the witnesses, may 
sooner or later appear to favor one side over the other, which might unduly influence their line 
of questioning.
143
 The former law on appellate proceedings, though, was argued to serve as a 
safeguard, since the prevailing review de novo standard gave the parties “a second bite at the 
apple”.144 This review standard was also argued to be sustainable due to the overall economy 
and speed of the entire proof process at the trial court level.
145
 
c) Finding the Truth 
(1) 
Yet, specifically this last aspect is discussed controversially and vehemently and some 
see the question of ascertaining the truth as a particularly strong feature of the German system 
of civil procedure. 
The lawyer-dominated system of civil procedure in the U.S. is criticized for its 
incentives to distort evidence;
146
 partisanship is said to have potential “to pollute the sources 
of truth”.147 The many steps of partisan interview and preparation, pretrial deposition, 
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preparation for trial, and examination and cross-examination of witnesses at trial take their 
toll in expense and irritation
148
 and allow too much latitude for bullying and other truth-
defeating strategies.
149
 Especially cross-examination is not only frequently truth-defeating or 
ineffectual, it is also described as being “tedious, repetitive, time-wasting, and insulting".150 
Additionally the “battle of opposing experts”151 leads to a systematic distrust and devaluation 
of expertise, since experts are party-selected and party-paid and therefore vulnerable to 
attacks on credibility and bias regardless of the merits of their testimony.
152
 
In the German system judges rather than the parties or their attorneys take the main 
responsibility for gathering and sifting evidence, although the lawyers exercise a “watchful 
eye” over the court's work.153 Supposedly, judicial control of the evidentiary process greatly 
reduces, if not eliminates, the attorneys' opportunities to coach witnesses prior to trial, bully 
or confuse them during their testimony,
154
 which enhances the accuracy of the proof-taking.
155
 
Furthermore, since judges question the witnesses directly, they can focus the interview on the 
issues at stake in the lawsuit purposefully, looking to clarify unanswered questions relevant to 
their decision.
156
 Additionally, following the German rules of civil procedure, witnesses are 
ordinarily examined only once.
157
 
With regards to experts, the “essential insight” of German civil procedure is thought to 
be: “Credible expertise must be neutral expertise”.158 In Germany, expert witnesses are 
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neutral third parties called by the court and paid by the losing party after the trial,
159
 so no 
“battle of the experts” can arise. The responsibility for selecting and informing experts is 
placed upon the court, although -- as with regards to the entire process of proof-taking -- with 
important protections for party interests.
160
 German attorneys can protect their clients' 
interests by suggesting witnesses to be called, asking follow-up questions to the witnesses 
after the judges have finished their interrogation, objecting to the judges' summation of the 
witnesses' testimony, commenting on the court-appointed expert's report, and offering other 
experts to challenge the opinion of the court-appointed one.
161
 
Yet, when considering the benefits of a judge-driven system of civil procedure, one 
also has to take into account that, making judges do most of the work, clearly imposes a 
greater burden on judicial resources and has to result in employing more judges.
162
 
(2) 
The German system of civil procedure is also credited with its consistency. 
Following the professional and hierarchical nature of the German system -- the use of 
professional judges (rather than hired advocates and ad hoc juries) to gather and to evaluate 
evidence, the requirement of detailed written judgements, and the (former) scope of review on 
appeal
163
 -- supposedly leads to a higher predictability of the outcome of a dispute.  
This can add to the social value of legal judgements by reducing present and 
prospective litigants’ uncertainty about the likely outcomes of litigation, thereby reducing the 
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costs associated with uncertainty, and increasing the proportion and the consistency of out-of-
court settlements.
164
 
(3) 
A civil action before a German court is said to be quicker and less expensive,
165
 
especially with regards to the “average dispute”166 which involves a comparatively small 
amount of money, raises no major issue of public policy, and is merely a dispute between 
private parties about private rights.
167
 
Because there is no pretrial discovery phase, fact-gathering occurs only once, and 
because the court establishes the sequence of fact-gathering according to criteria of 
relevance
168
 without a fixed-sequence or single-continuous-trial rule, unnecessary 
investigation is thought to be minimized.
169
 “Anyone who has had to wade through the 
longwinded narrative of American pretrial depositions and trial transcripts (which preserve 
every inconsequential utterance, every false start, every stammer) would see at once the 
economy of the German approach to taking and preserving evidence”.170 German judges 
dictate summaries of testimony, producing a more concise and usable record.
171
 
On the other hand judgements of German courts are vastly more detailed than the 
enigmatic verdicts of common-law juries, specifying the factual findings and legal 
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conclusions on which the court's action is based.
172
 Since it can take weeks to compose such a 
written verdict, this aspect again counters the general assumption of speediness of German 
civil courts. 
(4) 
The German rules of civil procedure are deemed to grant a comparatively easy access 
to a judge for consideration of the merits at a relatively early stage in the litigation.
173
 
Following the rules of civil procedure earlier presented, German judges are involved in the 
organization and course of the litigation from a very early point on. They are obligated to 
prepare the main hearing by requiring the parties to clarify positions, obtaining documents, 
summoning parties and witnesses to the hearing (§ 273 ZPO) and by being “mindful of a 
compromise settlement of the dispute or particular issues at all stages of the lawsuit” (§ 278 I 
ZPO). Therefore, parties can learn about the court’s opinion on their case and its chances of 
success quite early. 
(5) 
Other authors see the “conference method”,174 the discontinuous trial system in 
Germany, as beneficial. It lessens tension and theatrics, and it encourages settlement.
175
 
Surprise is not felt to be a substantial danger,
176
 especially since, if new facts or relevant 
questions of fact arise during the main hearing or the interrogation of witnesses and experts, 
each party has to be given the opportunity to address the aspect further (§ 283 ZPO). 
Additionally, the court is not permitted to rest its decision on an aspect of fact or law that a 
party has overlooked or considered irrelevant, or that the court assesses differently from both 
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parties, unless it has given them notice of this point and the opportunity to respond to it (§ 139 
II ZPO). 
But taking into account these rules that are directly relevant to the Anspruch auf 
rechtliches Gehör (constitutionally guaranteed right to be heard), one also has to concede that 
they can, in reality, seriously hinder the expedite resolution of a civil case before a German 
court.
177
 Especially in more complex cases they regularly constitute the necessity of several, 
in theory even an unlimited number of hearings,
178
 which can actually be quite time-
consuming,
179
 and has often been criticized on that ground.
180
 
 
These actual problems, caused by the significance of the Anspruch auf rechtliches 
Gehör embodied especially by § 139 ZPO, the court’s Hinweispflicht (obligation to give 
notices and advice), will be explained in detail in the following Part II of this paper. 
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Part II 
As Ronald J. Allen, Stefan Köck, Kurt Riecherberg and D. Toby Rosen aptly pointed 
out, “it would be useful to know how the process actually works”,181 before drawing any 
conclusions as to a possible superiority of one system.
182
 
So using the example of § 139 ZPO I want to give a more practical insight into daily 
challenges of Germen judges working the German Code of Civil Procedure.
183
 
1. § 139 ZPO 
The provision reads: 
Substantive conduct of a case 
(1) If necessary the court is to discuss the relevant facts and issues in dispute 
from a factual and legal perspective with the parties and to put questions to them. The 
court is to induce the parties to declare their positions timely and exhaustively 
concerning all significant facts, especially to further substantiate insufficient 
information to the asserted facts, to designate the means of proof, and to file the 
relevant petitions. 
(2) The court is not permitted to rest its decision on an aspect of fact or law that 
a party has apparently overlooked or considered insignificant, and that does not merely 
concern a minor accessory claim, unless it has given the parties notice of this point and 
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given them the opportunity to respond to it. The same rule applies, if the court assesses 
an aspect of fact or law differently than both parties do. 
(3) The court is to give the parties notice of any concerns it has with respect to 
aspects the court has to consider on its own motion. 
(4) Notices according to this rule are to be given as early as possible and 
documented on the record. Their issuing can only be proven by the content of the 
record. Only the proof of forgery of the record is permissible to contradict its content. 
(5) If a party is unable to promptly respond to a notice by the court, the court, 
on the motion of the party, shall set a time limit for further assertion by written brief. 
2. Spirit and Purpose 
§ 139 ZPO embodies the concept of courts’ responsibility for the materielle 
Prozessleitung (substantive conduct of the case),
184
 which also constitutes the courts’ 
Hinweispflicht (obligation to give notices and advice). It is an important feature of German 
civil justice
185
 and serves a variety of purposes. 
a) Anspruch auf rechtliches Gehör (constitutional right to be heard) 
§ 139 ZPO is a key provision in the German law of civil procedure. It is especially 
based on and concretizes the constitutionally guaranteed Anspruch auf rechtliches Gehör 
                                                          
 
184
 Dr. Dirk von Selle, in Beck’scher Online-Kommentar ZPO, 19th ed. (2015), § 139 para. 1; “an enactment 
apostrophized (…) as the Magna Carta of German civil procedure” (Kaplan, et al., Civil Procedure I (note 31), at 
1224). 
185
 Murray/Stürner (note 22), at 166; Rühl (note 45), at 916. 
39 
 
(right to be heard).
186
 It is, therefore, of considerable significance when dealing with common 
civil cases before a German court. 
b) Verbot von Überraschungsentscheidungen (ban of surprise decisions) 
The court is in breach of the right to be heard, if its decision comes as a surprise to 
either party. § 139 II ZPO is supposed to enforce the so-called Verbot von 
Überraschungsentscheidungen (ban of surprise decisions).
187
 The court must not base its 
decision on an aspect of fact or law that any diligent and skillful party did not have to 
anticipate even when taking various judicial conceptions into account.
188
 So the court has to 
advise the parties of its view of the case before ruling on it, to give the parties the opportunity 
to comment on that aspect and/or to align their judicial conduct with the court’s view. 
c) Fair Trial 
Furthermore, § 139 ZPO intends to provide for a fair trial, which is also 
constitutionally guaranteed in Germany (Art. 2 I, 20 III GG) and even codified in Art. 6 I 1 of 
the European Convention of Human Rights.
189
 § 139 ZPO, in this context, ensures that neither 
mistakes nor differences in skills and diligence put one party at a disadvantage, and the 
Grundsatz der Waffengleichheit (principle of equality of arms) is served.
190
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d) Konzentrationsmaxime (principle of concentration) 
By discussing the aspects of fact and law of a case openly and giving specific notices 
to the parties at an early stage, § 139 ZPO imposes a duty on the courts to clarify the cause 
and lead the parties toward full development of their respective positions.
191
 Thereby, the 
subject-matter of the proceedings is supposed to be specified and focused to avoid 
unnecessary conflict, effort and expenditure of time.
192
 In this respect, § 139 ZPO also serves 
the Konzentrationsmaxime (principle of concentration). It is assumed that only if the parties 
can actually trust the court to fulfill its function to govern the substantive conduct of the case, 
they will effectively be willing to restrict the lawsuit to the aspects that are actually relevant to 
the case.
193
 
e) Duty of Care 
Particularly in the context of the last judicial reform in effect since 2002 the legislator 
emphasized the joint responsibility of the court for a “comprehensive factual and legal 
resolution of the matter”.194 Even though the earlier explained Beibringungsgrundsatz 
(principle of party presentation) generally leaves it to the parties to determine the scope of the 
dispute and to provide the court with the necessary facts and means of proof for its decision, 
§ 139 ZPO imposes an additional duty of care and responsibility on the court to provide for a 
fair trial that excludes arbitrariness and that is solely aimed at ascertaining the truth.
195
 So 
§ 139 ZPO, when applied appropriately, does not penetrate the Beibringungsgrundsatz by 
introducing an inquisitorial element, but it adds to it an aspect of assistance by the court. It 
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still remains within the discretion of the parties, whether and how to react to notices by the 
court.
196
 
f) Dialogic Civil Trial 
§ 139 ZPO is, thereby, said to be based on a “model of a communicative or dialogic 
civil trial”.197 Both court and parties are supposed to “put their cards on the table”.198 § 139 
ZPO entails a concept of work-sharing between counsel and court,
199
 which is supposed to 
enhance the quality of judicial products overall.
200
 
g) Settlement 
Though this is not the original intention of the provision, in reality, the judges’ 
obligation to give notices pursuant to § 139 ZPO can often provide valuable guidance and 
assistance to the parties in settlement negotiations.
201
 
3. Limitations 
As these remarks on the purpose of § 139 ZPO already indicate, the court’s duty to 
govern the substantive conduct of a civil case is also subject to distinct limits. 
a) Neutrality 
The judges’ obligations within § 139 ZPO are obviously limited by their statutory duty 
to be neutral and impartial.
202
 The court must not give up its equidistance to both parties and 
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become an advisor to only one of them.
203
 Otherwise it runs the risk of being challenged on 
the grounds of bias.
204
 
b) Beibringungsgrundsatz (principle of party presentation) 
As already mentioned earlier, the Beibringungsgrundsatz (principle of party 
presentation) also puts a limit on the court’s obligations within § 139 ZPO.205 While judges 
are bound by coinciding factual statements of both parties,
206
 this does not apply to legal 
opinions, even if they are shared by the parties. But the court has to give the parties notice and 
the opportunity to respond to it, if it wants to decide the case based on a different legal 
opinion.
207
 
However, responding to the Beibringungsgrundsatz the court must not broaden the 
matter in dispute by giving advice to the parties pursuant to § 139 ZPO. Judges are not 
allowed to hint either party to any additional means of challenge or defense.
208
 A permissible 
notice within § 139 ZPO requires the means of challenge or defense to, at least suggestively, 
already be subject of the party’s pleading.209 
So the court’s duty to give notices following § 139 ZPO may not be confused as an 
expression of inquisitorial responsibility for determining the general truth of the case at hand. 
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It is more aptly characterized as requiring judges to assist and advise the parties in resolving 
their dispute according to law.
210
 
4. Walking the Thin Line 
This short overview already shows the difficulty of where exactly to draw the line 
between permissible assistance and inadmissible partisanship by the court. Judges have to 
‘walk a very thin line’ when applying § 139 ZPO.211 
Additionally, due to the fundamental changes in the appellate law as of the judicial 
reform in 2002, which has not been subject to the majority of American literature on the 
German law of civil procedure, § 139 ZPO has been gaining even more significance. 
As presented earlier in Part I of this paper, the first level of appeal no longer involves a 
review de novo, but may only be based on the objection that the decision has been based on a 
violation of the law, because a legal norm has not been applied or has not been applied 
properly (§ 546 ZPO), or that the facts the decision was based upon justify a different decision 
(§ 513 ZPO).
212
 Additionally, new means of challenge or defense can only be raised in the 
second instance, if they were not asserted in the first instance proceedings due to a procedural 
error (§ 531 II 1, No. 2 ZPO). This specifically raises the significance of § 139 ZPO.
213
 
The objection that the court of first instance failed to give the necessary notice under 
§ 139 ZPO is regularly raised in an appeal, because a breach of § 139 ZPO constitutes a 
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procedural error.
214
 So in practice, lawyers will be keen to claim or provoke a violation of 
§ 139 ZPO to effectuate a new factual review and to facilitate the introduction of new factual 
assertions in the second instance.
215
 However, the appellant then has to present specifically 
what statements she would have already introduced in the first instance had the court given 
her the necessary notice pursuant to § 139 ZPO,
216
 and in what way these additional facts 
would have changed the outcome of the case in her favor.
217
 
This, again, explains why § 139 ZPO is of major significance in the daily life of 
German civil judges. To illustrate how ‘thin this line judges have to walk on every day’ 
actually is and how regularly judges are confronted with the decision whether to give notice 
pursuant to § 139 ZPO, I want to raise some very practical questions based on everyday 
situations and examples. 
It will not come as a surprise to say that there is no right or wrong answer to any of the 
following questions. I would assume that the manner in which judges deal with the different 
situations will most likely depend on their personality, their accustomed modus operandi and 
their experience with certain kinds of cases and/or specific parties or lawyers.
218
 
a) 
At what stage of the proceedings does the court have to give the necessary notice? 
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Example: 
The plaintiff claims in her initial written complaint that the parties have entered 
a valid contract which the defendant breached. The plaintiff does not give any further 
details as to when, where or how the parties entered said contract so the judge cannot 
asses on her own whether the contract is actually valid. 
§ 139 IV 1 ZPO provides that notices by the court are to be given as early as 
possible.
219
 The parties are to be given the opportunity to react upon the court’s advice in due 
time before the main hearing.
220
 Therefore, as the case may be, a notice might already have to 
be given before the defendant has even responded to the initial complaint.
221
 
In the abovementioned model case, the court does not have the necessary facts to 
verify whether the parties have actually entered a valid contract which the plaintiff can base 
her claim on. But if this assertion is not contested, i.e. both parties agree on having entered a 
valid contract, the court does not need any more facts on this aspect to decide the case. So this 
raises the question: should the judge in the model case immediately give notice to the plaintiff 
that, if the defendant contests the statement of a valid contract, she will have to give more 
factual details as to when, where and how that contract was entered and maybe indicate means 
of proof? Or should she wait for the defendant’s response to the claim and see whether the 
contention is actually contested or not, before deciding whether to give said notice? Judges 
that tend to choose the first alternative run the risk of being called ‘overactive’, assuming all 
factual assertions will be contested by the opposing party.
222
 They might also be accused of 
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‘putting ideas into the defendant’s head’ by such an early notice, which judges must not do 
due to their obligation to be impartial. Such an early notice might also be said to contradict 
the Konzentrationsmaxime (principle of concentration): why give such an advice and make 
the plaintiff give more information and indicate means of proof, if the assertion eventually 
remains uncontested? On the other hand, giving said notice as soon as possible might, in the 
end, save time, because the plaintiff can already add to her claim, while the court waits for the 
defendant’s answer to the complaint. 
b) 
If the parties are represented by lawyers,
223
 is the court at all obligated to give advice 
pursuant § 139 ZPO? Or is there, perhaps, less of an obligation? 
Example: 
The plaintiff sues the defendant for damages based on the assertion that the 
defendant dented her car during an incident that happened five years ago. The 
defendant, appearing before the court as pro se litigant, responds by denying to have 
dented the plaintiff’s car and by arguing for it to not be fair to be sued because of 
something that supposedly happened such a long time ago. She does not explicitly 
refer to the statute of limitation, which would apply in the given case,
224
 but which has 
to be formally pled under German law. 
Does anything change, if the defendant is represented by a lawyer, but still 
does not explicitly plead the statute of limitation? 
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In contrast to former legal practice, it is now generally assumed that § 139 ZPO 
applies in the same way, whether the parties are represented by an attorney or come before the 
court as pro se litigants.
225
 But the intensity or extent of the notice may be reduced,
226
 when 
parties are represented by lawyers, because, naturally, the court can expect more from a 
legally trained person than from a lay person.
227
 § 139 ZPO shall, however, prevail 
unrestrictedly, if the attorney recognizably errs or assumes to have already offered sufficient 
statements for her client.
228
 It is said to be irrelevant at this point, if the lawyer acts 
negligently,
229
 though it is ultimately not the job of the judge to relieve the parties of the 
consequences of gross and persistent negligence or lack of competence of their counsel.
230
 At 
the same time the court must, by all means, not become a legal advisor to a pro se litigant.
231
 
This application of § 139 ZPO seems to rather contradict than serve the Grundsatz der 
Waffengleichheit (principle of equality of arms) and sure enough continuously challenges 
judges of Local Courts that have to deal with pro se litigants on a regular basis.
232
 But one 
also has to take into account that it is the free choice of any party to decide for or against legal 
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representation or even a legal consultation, if they don’t have to be represented by an attorney 
in court.
233
 
Having said that, § 139 ZPO is still supposed to balance possible ‘structural 
inferiority’ of a party and ensure a dispute ‘at eye level’,234 though this leads to an inequality 
at the same time. Any kind of deficient submission by a party, whether caused by negligence 
or not, obligates the court to act upon § 139 ZPO.
235
 Therefore a carelessly litigating party 
benefits from the court’s assistance and differences in diligence by counsel are evened out.236 
As to the given model case, it is again difficult to give a simple right-or-wrong answer. 
If the defendant is represented by a lawyer, it might be difficult to argue that she obviously 
overlooked the necessity to explicitly plead the statute of limitation, since this is quite basic 
legal knowledge and there might be a specific reason for her to not plead this defense.
237
 But 
one might also argue that, especially since it is such basic legal knowledge, it can only be an 
obvious error not to plead the statute of limitation explicitly, especially since potential 
negligence is irrelevant in the context of § 139 ZPO. 
Regarding a pro se defendant it might easily be assumed that she just does not know 
that she has to plead the statute of limitation explicitly and, since she has already brought up 
the issue of the potential incident having happened “a long time ago”, one might argue the 
court having to advise her respectively according to § 139 ZPO. But, again, this can be seen 
as being problematic with regards to the abovementioned obligation of the court to not 
broaden the matter in dispute by giving notice to the parties pursuant to § 139 ZPO. The court 
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is not to hint either party to any additional means of challenge or defense,
238
 which the plea of 
the statute of limitation obviously is. 
c) 
At what point do judges have to assume their decision will come as a surprise to the 
parties? Does not every party have to take into account that someone else, might it be the 
opposing party or the court, will not share their legal opinion? Or that the court might follow 
the opponent’s line of argument?239 
It is, at least, generally agreed that the appellate court has to notify the appellee, if and 
why it intends to deviate from the initial decision and give sufficient time and opportunity to 
react to that.
240
 In all other situations one will have to say again that the decision depends on 
the circumstances of the specific case and the modus operandi of the respective court. 
d) 
Does the court have to give a party notice with regards to an aspect the opponent has 
already pointed out? 
Example: 
The plaintiff sues the defendant for damages for pain and suffering due to 
medical malpractice. The defense argues in their response to the claim that the plaintiff 
has not given enough facts as to what kind of pain and suffering she supposedly 
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sustained after the treatment; she did not satisfy her obligation to substantiate her 
claim sufficiently (§ 138 I ZPO). 
Courts have ruled that judges can omit § 139 ZPO, if the party has been advised 
appropriately by the opponent, at least if that party is represented by a lawyer.
241
 An 
additional notice by the court would be nothing more but a mere repetition of the opponent’s 
information.
242
 The court’s obligation, however, is said to be revived, if the respective party 
evidently misinterpreted or ignored the opponent’s advice.243 Taking into account that § 139 
ZPO applies regardless of a party’s possible negligence, it is easy to imagine how difficult it 
can be to decide in a specific case whether the opponent’s advice was already sufficient 
and/or whether the advised party has still apparently overlooked the aspect or considered it 
insignificant, especially since notices by the court are, according to experience, taken more 
seriously than statements by the opposing party.
244
 
e) 
What do judges have to do, if a party is obviously aware of its procedural obligation to 
do something – and then does not? 
Example: 
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To sufficiently nominate a person as a witness, the party is required to give the 
court that person’s name and a valid address, where she can be subpoenaed.245 If the 
lawyer does not have the witness’s name and address yet before entering the brief, it is 
customary for her to indicate the witness as “N.N.”.246 But as the case proceeds the 
lawyer does not give that potential witness’s name and address, even though her 
testimony is obviously relevant to the outcome of the case. 
Does the court have to notify that lawyer respectively and give her (further) 
opportunity to nominate that witness correctly? Does § 139 ZPO really ask for such a notice? 
While the Federal Supreme Court used to rather not see an obligation by the court to 
give notice and further opportunity to correctly indicate the witness already named as 
“N.N.”,247 it has by now changed its opinion, at least in cases in which the witness has already 
been “sufficiently individualized”.248 In legal literature, this question is still discussed highly 
controversially.
249
 In practice, however, I assume that most courts actually give the respective 
party notice and a deadline to indicate the full name and address of said witness, be it only to 
‘keep the appellate door shut’.250 
f) 
Similar to this matter is the question, if and when the court has to potentially repeat a 
notice under § 139 ZPO. 
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In principle, judges need not repeat a notice, if they have already given clear and 
unambiguous advice on something.
251
 Even if, ultimately, it is not the job of the court to 
relieve the parties of the consequences of gross and persistent negligence or lack of 
competence of their counsel,
252
 the Federal Supreme Court, nevertheless, has ruled that, if the 
advised party still does not react appropriately to the notice and/or misunderstands it, the court 
will have to give another specific notice and the opportunity to further respond to it.
253
 The 
same applies, if the court changes its view on something during the proceedings.
254
 
In practice, it will again be difficult in particular cases to determine whether a notice 
has not been answered sufficiently by the party, because she assumes she has already done so, 
because she misunderstands it, or because she is simply not able to submit anything else. 
g) 
This leads to another general, but in practice very relevant question that is similarly 
difficult to answer. 
Has a party not substantiated her claim any further, because she cannot do so, because 
she thinks she does not have to do so or because she evidently overlooked the entire aspect 
altogether? 
The Federal Supreme Court has ruled in one of its decisions that the court has to 
induce the parties to declare their positions exhaustively, if certain statements are missing that 
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can generally be expected in similar cases.
255
 Only if the claim is missing any substance at all, 
further advice by the court becomes superfluous.
256
 
In particular cases it can be quite challenging to assess whether a party has overlooked 
an aspect or does not substantiate her claim any further simply because she cannot do so. 
Practical experience shows, though, that in many cases parties actually do give the court all 
the facts they have for a case; and, if they do not, it is just because they cannot give any more 
facts. This might even be more valid as of the judicial reform in 2002, since new facts can 
only be entered on appeal under very limited conditions.
257
 
But it might be risky for judges to rely on that experience, because a missed notice 
under § 139 ZPO can ‘open the door’ for an appeal.258 On the other hand, giving too many 
advices pursuant to § 139 ZPO obviously contradicts the aim of a speedy and focused 
resolution of the case. 
h) 
Many lawyers have come up with the habit to enter into every written brief a general 
request similar to this: 
“If the court deems necessary any further factual or legal submissions, we 
kindly ask for notice pursuant to § 139 ZPO.”259 
Does such a request change anything? 
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It is generally assumed that a request put in such a set phrases has no influence on the 
court’s obligations under § 139 ZPO.260 Required advice has to be given anyway, further 
notices do not.
261
 So one might say such a request never makes any sense and should normally 
be left out of briefs. 
However, in practice, such a request can sometimes actually be quite sensible. In 
certain cases, further submissions on specific aspects of a case are only relevant if the court 
takes a certain view on a legal matter. To avoid unnecessary effort and costs by everybody 
involved in the proceedings it can make sense to ask the court for its opinion on the specific 
matter before giving all the facts that might, in the end, be completely irrelevant. 
i) 
Last but not least, it can sometimes be challenging to ascertain at what point a general 
discussion of the factual and legal matters during the main hearing becomes a formal notice 
pursuant to § 139 ZPO. 
As explained earlier,
262
 judges are obligated to discuss the factual and legal matters of 
the case openly with the parties during the main hearing. This, quite regularly, prompts the 
party that fears to lose her case to request a notice according to § 139 ZPO and enter a motion 
to be given the opportunity to comment further on that matter in a written brief (§ 139 V 
ZPO), be it to delay the decision, be it to try to obtain more information on an aspect of the 
case. The court, then, has to decide whether the judicial review actually included advice under 
§ 139 ZPO, whether such a notice was actually in order and whether the party has to be given 
further opportunity to comment on that aspect in a written brief. The latter will basically 
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always be necessary, if the matter does not concern an aspect of the case which is subject to 
personal perception by the party attending the hearing.
263
 
If the court grants this additional opportunity to enter a written brief, the case cannot 
be ruled upon at the end of that hearing, which is generally the purpose of every main hearing 
(see § 272 I ZPO).
264
 If the court denies the motion, it runs the risk to be overruled on an 
appeal for not having applied § 139 ZPO correctly.
265
 
5. Discussion 
Against the background of the constitutionally guaranteed right to be heard, the 
principle of equality of arms and the general aim of any trial to ascertain the truth of the 
matter to base a decision on, § 139 ZPO makes a lot of sense. All parties, whether they choose 
to be represented by an attorney or not, shall have the same chances before the court. 
Therefore, a possible lapse of diligence by a lawyer is supposed to be evened out by the court. 
But that, to me, is rather the theoretical point of view. 
The abovementioned various questions and examples vividly show the difficulties in 
the practical application of § 139 ZPO. The explanation also shows how unpredictable judges’ 
behavior regarding notices under § 139 ZPO can be. As the examples presented afore show, 
though, the appellate courts in their decisions have rather extended the scope of § 139 ZPO 
than limited it. 
Still, from a judge’s point of view, it sometimes seems beneficial to be able to steer the 
course of a case by giving notices under § 139 ZPO early on. It enables the court as well as 
the parties to focus the matter on those aspects the judge actually deems necessary for her 
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decision and to leave out irrelevant issues. This can actually save a lot of time and effort and, 
thereby, expedite proceedings. 
And yet, § 139 ZPO in reality puts a lot of responsibility on judges. They are not only 
to determine the necessary facts of the case and means of proof and, eventually, rule on the 
case. They are also obligated to keep track of what might come as a surprise to a party, what 
one party might have overlooked or deemed irrelevant to the case, what additional facts or 
means of proof a party might be able to give, to even out possible disparities in the 
representation of the parties and so forth. Accordingly, judges have to make sure to give all 
the necessary notices pursuant to § 139 ZPO and not give the parties a reason to appeal -- 
without overdoing it and thereby procrastinating the resolution of the case. Also, judges must, 
at all times, still respect the Beibringungsgrundsatz (principle of party presentation) and, most 
of all, always stay impartial and neutral. 
This seems a lot to put on a single person.
266
 
It weighs even more if it is taken into account that the daily practice in German courts 
in the past years has shown that lawyers tend to rely more and more on the court’s duty to 
give notices under § 139 ZPO. Though some lawyers criticize the abovementioned 
‘overactive judges’ for taking matters too much into their hands or for sometimes even 
appearing to find proceedings to be “hindered by the participation of lawyers”,267 from a 
judge’s point of view things often appear the other way around. So if Herbert L. Bernstein 
writes, “The process thus should be understood and described not as court-conducted, but as a 
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process conducted jointly by the court on the one hand and by the parties and their attorneys 
on the other hand”,268 from practical experience, this seems like ‘wishful thinking’. 
Many judges feel that quite a lot of lawyers just present the mere basics of a case in 
“minimalist briefs” and then almost lean back to wait for the court to tell them, what else to 
do.
269
 The reasons for such behavior can be versatile; lack of time, lack of qualification and 
lack of money are most likely only the most obvious ones. 
Anyhow, in these cases judges are rather forced to take matters into their hands to 
advance and expedite proceedings. Consequently, many main hearings in civil cases rather 
resemble a ‘one man show’ of the judge than the intended event of a communicative or 
dialogic civil trial, and not only because the court acts as examiner-in-chief during the taking 
of evidence. This tendency has even been reinforced by the legal practice of the appellate 
courts to more broadly grant appeals because of an insufficient application of § 139 ZPO by 
lower courts.
270
 
Not only does this raise the question of who does the lawyers’ work.271 Rather, this 
actual development runs contrary to the very basic principle of party presentation.
272
 It also 
bears the risk of, at some point, impairing the quality of decisions by civil courts. Though the 
judicial education of judges in Germany is certainly sophisticated, comprehensive and 
thorough,
273
 judges are humans and humans make mistakes. So the thought of sharing the 
accountability for ascertaining the truth and finding the most just and lawful decision based 
on that truth seems to be a lot more convincing than putting the lion’s share of the 
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responsibility on a single judge or even a panel of three judges. So, from my experience as a 
German judge, focusing on the fair trial canon and just having judges ‘put their cards on the 
table’, would serve more the actual purpose of § 139 ZPO and the right to be heard, than to 
have the court even out possible negligence or deficiency on either side of the parties and 
ensure ‘equality of arms’. The latter, in my opinion, too easily crosses the line towards 
actually litigating the case for the parties. 
Similarly, Peter L. Murray and Rolf Stürner compare the role of a German judge to 
that of a chess player playing against himself. “Or, more aptly, he must advise each player on 
the best available move. It is very hard to play this role effectively without overstepping the 
bounds one way or the other”.274 
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Part III 
As relevant as German judges’ impact on the substantive conduct of a case is in 
practice, as irrelevant is their influence on its formal course, especially with regards to 
counsels’ conduct. 
If and when parties violate their duty to state the facts comprehensively, truthfully 
(§ 138 I ZPO) and in a timely manner (§ 282 I ZPO), the German Code of Civil Procedure 
and other laws provide several remedies to sanction such misconduct.
275
 But these remedies 
are of rather limited significance to the daily work of German civil law judges. The remedies 
most relevant are of substantive nature; the ones concerning the bearing of costs or fees are 
hardly ever applied in practice. 
In particular, all available remedies are solely directed at the parties of the lawsuit, 
never their lawyers. 
1. Preclusion 
Though the court is authorized and obligated to set deadlines for the parties’ briefs and 
motions to be entered,
276
 these deadlines are, in practice, often a blunt sword. 
In theory, material that has not been presented to the court within a set deadline, must 
be precluded unless the court is persuaded either that admission will not delay the proceedings 
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or that the party's delay is adequately excused (§ 296 I ZPO).
277
 Ordinary negligence or fault 
has been established as the standard for preclusion of material subject to a fixed deadline.
278
 
However, a violation of the parties’ general duty to expedite proceedings (§ 282 ZPO) only 
entitles the court to preclude material, if its admission delayed proceedings and the tardiness 
was grossly negligent (§ 296 II ZPO). 
But taking into account the constitutional right to be heard as well as the duty of care 
generally imposed on the court, especially by § 139 ZPO, the application of § 296 ZPO is 
actually quite cumbersome. 
Since rules for preclusion are a direct limitation on the constitutional right to be 
heard,
279
 every erroneous preclusion of relevant material presents a potential federal 
constitutional issue.
280
 The Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court) has ruled 
that relevant material may only be precluded if the party had sufficient opportunity to 
comment on all relevant facts of the case and culpably did not use this opportunity, and if the 
party’s negligent behavior was the only reason for the delay in the proceedings; otherwise the 
constitutional right to be heard is violated.
281
 Due to the limitation of the constitutional right 
to be heard, the rules for preclusion are of exceptional character and have to be applied most 
conservatively.
282
 So the court has to do everything in its power to avoid any delay before 
deciding to preclude any material. Furthermore, following § 139 ZPO, the court must first 
give notice to the respective party whose material it intends to preclude and the opportunity to 
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respond to that.
283
 Any violation of the court’s duty of care and duty to facilitate proceedings 
as well as any formal defect in the setting or notification of deadlines will bar preclusion of 
late material.
284
 
Finally, all this does not take into account that, in practice, most deadlines are and, due 
to the constitutional right to be heard, have to be extended regularly on request of the parties 
on grounds like schedule difficulties between party and counsel, temporary absence of 
counsel due to vacation or sickness or an overload of work on the part of the lawyer. 
Therefore, there are actually only very few cases in which parties’ material is permissibly 
precluded under § 296 ZPO. 
2. Costs or Fees 
There are few exceptions to the abovementioned loser-pays-rule for allocating the 
costs of a civil lawsuit for violating the duty to state the facts comprehensively, truthfully 
(§ 138 I ZPO) and in a timely manner (§ 282 I ZPO). 
§ 95 ZPO provides that parties shall bear the costs caused by their failure to attend a 
hearing or to meet a deadline, or by a hearing to be deferred or a deadline to be extended due 
to their negligence.
285
 However, due to the abovementioned general cost structure, such 
separable costs can hardly ever be determined and are, therefore, in practice, virtually never 
allocated pursuant § 95 ZPO.
286
 For similar reasons, § 96 ZPO is of barely more practical 
significance. Under § 96 ZPO, costs of means of challenge or defense brought to no avail may 
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be imposed on the pleading party, even if she has prevailed on the merits of the case. But, 
again, for a decision under § 96 ZPO judges have to be able to specify the costs caused by the 
specific means of challenge or defense and these costs must not already be borne by that party 
due to the general rules.
287
 
Historically, § 278 II ZPO, in the version effective until 1977,
288
 provided for the court 
to allocate the entire costs of the lawsuit or at least part of them to a party for presenting any 
means of challenge or defense belatedly, even though it could have presented its material at 
an earlier time, and thereby delaying the proceedings. Such a provision, giving the court the 
opportunity to allocate a share of the overall costs to a party violating its duty to state the facts 
comprehensively, truthfully and in a timely manner, does no longer exist in the German Code 
of Civil Procedure. 
Under current law, however, judges can impose a particular additional fee on either 
party, if, due to their fault or their lawyer’s fault, a hearing had to be deferred, an additional 
hearing became necessary or the proceedings were delayed due to the tardy presentation of 
means of challenge or defense, that could have been entered at an earlier time (§ 38 
GKG)
289
.
290
 The amount of this so called Verzögerungsgebühr (retardation fee) is determined 
by the court, but is, in principle, also based on the general court fees and thereby also depends 
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on the amount in dispute.
291
 The fee has to be paid to the court and not to the opposing 
party.
292
 
The retardation fee is a true sanction and supposed to penalize culpable conduct 
contrary to the procedural rules.
293
 The fee can, therefore, not be imposed, if a party’s 
conduct, though actually delaying proceedings, stays within the rules of procedure.
294
 
Furthermore, the party’s conduct alone must have caused the delay.295 If the delay is in any 
way also caused by the court, e.g. by not giving the proper notice under § 139 ZPO in due 
time, the retardation fee must not be imposed due to its character as a punitive measure.
296
 
Rather, the court is obliged to exploit all options suitable to prevent the delay caused by the 
tardy submissions.
297
 And, naturally, it has to give notice to the respective party and the 
opportunity to respond first (§ 139 ZPO) before imposing the retardation fee, to ensure the 
party’s right to be heard.298 
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Yet, § 38 GKG has virtually no relevance in the actual work of German judges.
299
 
Most judges have never applied this rule,
300
 maybe because the requirements for its 
application seem too difficult to fulfill, taking the court’s prior obligations into account,301 
maybe because it seems to be actually widely unknown.
302
 
3. Lawyers’ Misconduct 
As initially stated the abovementioned rules concerning the allocation of specific costs 
or retardation fees caused by one side’s procedural misconduct are all directed at the parties, 
not their lawyers. Though § 38 S. 3 GKG explicitly provides that any fault of the attorney is 
equivalent to a fault of the party,
303
 the retardation fee can by no means be imposed on the 
lawyer.
304
 If parties feel to have been misrepresented by their counsel and therefore have to 
pay a retardation fee or have to bear specific costs under §§ 95, 96 ZPO, they will have to 
claim restitution by their lawyer outside of the proceedings.
305
 
In German procedural law, there is no rule that allows judges to impose any kind of 
punitive fee on counsel.
306
 The court has no immediate power to allocate any costs at or 
reprimand a lawyer within the respective lawsuit for any kind of procedural misconduct. Even 
§§ 177, 178 GVG, which enable judges to take measures like arrests or fines for contempt of 
court or to maintain the necessary order in the courtroom, do not apply to lawyers involved in 
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the given civil lawsuit,
307
 since they are regarded as an independent, though equally ranking 
Organ der Rechtspflege (institution of the judicature, officer of the court).
308
 The provision 
that allowed judges to also fine a lawyer for contempt of court (§ 180 GVG)
309
 was 
invalidated in 1921
310
 without replacement.
311
 The same goes for § 102 ZPO
312
 that used to 
provide for punitive fees for lawyers for grossly negligent procedural misconduct; it was 
eliminated in 1964.
313
 
A possibility to impose civil sanctions on attorneys or law firms as, for example, 
provided in Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure does not exist in German law of 
civil procedure. Judges also have no discretion whatsoever to impose any other sanctions that 
are not specifically provided by law. 
4. Time and Page Limits 
Last but not least, for the sake of completeness, I want to note that time limits during 
hearings as well as page limits for written statements are entirely unknown to the German law 
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of civil procedure. With regard to the often-cited, afore explained constitutional right to be 
heard and its outstanding impact on the German Code of Civil Procedure as well as its 
practical application, such regulations or restrictions are thoroughly unimaginable for German 
civil judges. However, looking from an outsider’s point of view, I have to admit that these 
measures do sometimes seem appealing. 
67 
 
Conclusion 
Both American and German civil courts aim to provide a system to resolve private 
disputes in an overall effective, cost saving, trustworthy and equitable manner. Yet, the ways 
both systems go about this goal could hardly be any more different. 
Certainly, the most obvious and manifest difference between both systems is the role 
of the judge, with a German judge “operat(ing) the judicial machinery of his system”314 like 
“the paterfamilias”.315 Though, as I have explained earlier, the German system is not 
“inquisitorial”, as some describe it, civil judges undeniably play a by far more active role in 
civil proceedings than their American counterparts. Aside from the fact that the decision of 
the lawsuit always lies with them, they have to determine the necessary facts of the case and 
means of proof, act as examiner-in-chiefs during the taking of the evidence and, last but not 
least, have a broad duty of care as to the substantive conduct of the case with their obligation 
to give notices and advice. 
Due to the fundamental differences of the American and the German Rules of Civil 
Procedure, it is, no doubt, interesting to compare both systems’ approaches and maybe even 
assess which one might be better. Some American jurists, for example, seem to look 
enviously at German judges’ entitlement to actively take part in the determination of the 
necessary facts of the case. John H. Langbein has started a lively discussion on a possible 
advantage of the German system over the American one in 1985.
316
 Many arguments 
exchanged in this debate appear compelling, when looking at the provisions of the German 
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Rules of Civil Procedure. But, as shown in this paper, there are some aspects that could give 
reasons to reconsider several of them. 
For example, with the comprehensive reform of the German rules of civil procedure in 
2002 the legislator has considerably strengthened the impact and the accountability of the first 
instance courts for the outcome of a civil lawsuit by restricting the first appellate level from a 
review de novo to a review for error to condense and expedite proceedings.
317
 This is even 
more remarkable when taking into consideration that most first instance civil cases before 
German courts are decided by single judges; a rule that has also been further expanded in the 
abovementioned reform to save resources of the judiciary.
318
 So the assumption that the entire 
proof process is so economical and speedy at the trial court level that the German system 
could afford a review de novo on appeal
319
 does not hold up any longer. Also, the idea that the 
system of appellate review has been designed to deter and correct abuse of the undeniable 
power of German judges
320
 might need to be reconsidered. 
Moreover, as shown in detail in Part II of this paper, the law imposes a broad 
obligation on judges to give extensive notices and advice to the parties at all stages of the 
proceedings. The current practical application of § 139 ZPO, the most prominent provision 
concerning the courts’ Hinweispflicht, has judges ‘walk a very thin line’ and sometimes even 
goes so far that some have started to raise the question as to who does the lawyers’ work.321 
This, again, might shed a different light on the efficiency of civil proceedings or the 
assessment of the predictability of judges‘ behavior as well as the outcome of civil lawsuits. 
In the end, one could even begin to ask, if and when the actual use of § 139 ZPO and the 
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broad impact and accountability of single judges for the entire case might have an effect on 
the quality of civil courts’ decisions, again taking into account the restriction of the appellate 
review. 
These examples show that several of the arguments exchanged in the discussion on the 
supposed virtues and vices of the German Rules of Civil Procedure compared to the American 
system of civil procedure can be challenged due to changes in the law as well as 
developments in the legal practice as to how certain provisions are to be applied. 
Additionally, using § 139 ZPO as an example, Part II of this paper reveals that a 
comparison of both systems on a mere technical level by just taking into account the 
individual laws and the legislator’s intent -- though seeming quite clear and straightforward -- 
easily falls short. The wording of § 139 ZPO as well as the legislator’s intent when enacting it 
clearly aim at concentrating and expediting proceedings and ensuring a fair trial for all parties 
without restricting the Beibringungsgrundsatz (principle of party presentation) or impairing 
the impartiality of the court. However, the practical use of the Hinweispflicht -- as explained 
in detail -- raises doubts as to the efficiency and reasonableness of § 139 ZPO. 
The significance and indispensability of taking into consideration the actual everyday 
use of the law is also supported by criticism offered regarding both systems. As mentioned 
before, Chief Justice Burger described the American system of civil procedure in 1984 as 
being „too costly, too painful, too destructive, too inefficient for a truly civilized people“.322 
Only recently a German civil lawyer similarly commented on civil trails in Germany as being 
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“time killing, expensive and often the results could just as well be left to a game of dice.”323 
Those views, more than anything, make clear that an evaluation of any system’s effectiveness, 
success or maybe even superiority over another should require a very close look not only at 
the letter of the law, but -- more than that -- a detailed appraisal of the application of it. 
As a German judge, I only have an insight into the practical use of the German Code 
of Civil Procedure in German courtrooms. I, therefore, do not see myself in a position to 
legitimately determine whether the American law of civil procedure is superior to the German 
one or vice versa. I obviously see more of the actual problems with the practical application of 
the German law of civil procedure, since I do not have a comparably deep insight into the 
American counterpart. In view of what the American law requires and allows judges to do, I 
can certainly imagine that some rules of the American law of civil procedure -- like for 
example the option to reprimand lawyers or to set time- and page limits -- would also be 
beneficial to solve some common problems in German civil courts and may thus be superior. 
But without seeing and deeply understanding how these rules are actually applied and what 
benefits and detriments might result from that practice, I cannot judge on the virtues those 
rules actually might entail if applied in Germany. 
After all, one will undoubtedly have to accept that there will never be “the best” rules 
of civil procedure, probably just rules of procedure that are capable of providing a certain 
optimum for a particular society in a particular historical era.
 324
 I am certain, though, that by 
taking a closer look at other countries, customs and laws one can broaden one’s insight into 
how differently the common problems of judicial work can be approached and solved. The 
                                                          
 
323
 Der Rechtsstreit (…) ist zeitraubend, teuer und das Ergebnis lässt sich häufig genauso gut würfeln. Luc 
Weinmann, “In den trägen Fängen der Justiz”, Zeit Online, 4 February 2016 
(http://www.zeit.de/gesellschaft/zeitgeschehen/2016-02/zivilrecht-reformen/komplettansicht). 
324
 Stürner (note 197), at 153. 
71 
 
full assessments and possible evaluation of alien rules of civil procedure, however, requires a 
deep insight far beyond the sheer letters of the law and the legislator’s intent into the actual 
courtroom and the common, practical use of the law. Only then one can possibly understand if 
the system really lives up to the expectations, since theory and practice might actually look 
quite different. 
So beware of judging a book just by its cover. 
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